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Notes
EqUITY RECEIVERSHIPS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF HARiONY BETWENi STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS
STATESmELN in the judiciary as well as in other branches of government have
long urged that the success of a federal system requires harmony in the
relations between state and nation. But in judicial administration the interest
of one or the other of the parties to a private litigation frequently tends to
obscure the public interest in the maintenance of harmony between tribunals
of concurrent jurisdiction. Particularly in the administration of debtors' estates
through the device of equity receiverships has conflict between state and
federal courts been common. Again ,and again, in recent years, the Supreme
Court has warned the lower federal courts to bp chary with the equity re-
ceivership remedy-to watch it with a "jealous eye.' 1 But, as indicated
by the occasions for repetition of the warning, district courts have not always
resisted the appeal of the parties or, perhaps, the opportunities for power and
patronage which equity receiverships afford.2 The covetous eye has sometimes
displaced the jealous eye.
In Biltrite Building Co. v. Elliott3 the dangers of a disregard of the
Supreme Court's admonitions are seen in clear relief. A South Carolina state
bank was closed by resolution of the directors, and its affairs were turned
over to the state bank examiner. A month later, on the petition of a group of
non-resident depositors, the federal court appointed an equity receiver for the
bank and authorized him to sue the stockholders for the "double liability"
imposed upon them by state statute.4 Prior to this appointment another group
of depositors acting under the same statute had begun an action against stock-
holders in a state court. The latter group sued the federal receiver in the
state court to enjoin him from enforcing the stockholders' liability in any
court.5 This blanket injunction was granted upon the ground that the state
1. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U. S. 334 "(1932); Shapiro v.
Wilgus, 287 U. S. 348 (1932); see Hlarkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 52
(1928). And criticism has been directed against the present liberality in the
appointment of equity receivers by federal courts. Jacobs, Problems in Federal
"Receivership" Jurisdi, tion (1932) 1 MERcER BEASLEY L. REv. 29; Note (1927)
41 HARv. L. RLv. 70; see Glaser v. Achtel-Stetter's Restaurant, 106 N. J. Eq.
150, 153, 149 Atl. 44, 46 (1930).
2. See Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 55
(1928): "Nor should there be any competition or rivalry on the part of the
two courts themselves in regard to assuming jurisdiction."
3. 166 S. C. 534, 165 S. E. 340 (1932).
4. S. C. CIV. CODE (1932) § 7855 provides for the appointment and com-
pensation of receivers to liluidate the assets of state banks which have been
taken over by the state bank examiner. It further authorizes "any receiver
appointed' to liquidate the assets of any closed state bank" to enforce the
stockholders' double liability provided for in S. C. CIV. CODE (1932) § 7868.
5. That the court intended to give the injunction this application is im-
plicit in the fact that it was issued before any suit was brought by the
receiver.
[1122]
statute which entitled "any receiver" to sue for the stockholders' double
liability did not apply to receivers appointed by the federal court. Thus was
the scene laid for an explosive conflict between state and federal authority.
It was obviated in part, however, by the federal court's subsequent revocation
of the power it had conferred upon its receiver.
Doubtless the depositors who sought a federal receiver had good grounds-
for preferring federal to state administration of the insolvent bank. But the
remedy of equity receiverships is traditionally available not as a matter of
right, but of discretion on the part of the court,0 and in the instant case it
seems hardly justifiable that the federal court should have permitted itself
to be injected into the controversy. The basis of jurisdiction was apparently
diversity of citizenship. The petitioners were ostensibly ordinary depositors,
not judgrment or secured creditors. Without the stockholders' liability, the
bank was admittedly insolvent in the bankruptcy sense. It was a state
institution. Most of its depositors, debtors and stockholders probably were
citizens or residents of that state. For the administration of insolvent state
banks the state had provided an administrative and judicial machinery which
had been duly invoked.7 Here was preeminently a case in which the interests
of federalism as well as proper discretion in the exercise of equity jurisdiction
required that the federal court should defer to the state administration.
Because of the unwarranted exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court,
the result reached by the state court in this case is at least understandable.
8
However, assuming that the appointment of a receiver by a federal court is
valid and proper, the construction here placed upon the state statute, in denying
to federal receivers the power to sue for the stockholders' double liability in
any court, is unsound, and the issuance of the injunction dangerous. The
power to sue in the federal courts in cases of diversity of citizenship is con-
ferred by federal statute pursuant to constitutional authority.
0 But the rights
and obligations thus sued upon are for the most part created by state law.
If, therefore, a state were to be permitted to restrict the enforcement of
substantive rights and obligations created by it and enforceable by ordinary
judicial process to its own courts, the federal right to sue in the United Statez
courts in cases of diversity of citizenship would be nullified. In the instant
case the state statute created a substantive liability in the stockholders
enforceable by judicial process.10 The corresponding right to sue thereon, insofar
as it is given to depositors, may not, in the case of non-residents, be confined
to enforcement in the state courts. And consequently the depositors' judicial
6. Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Mack, 347 Ill. 480, 180 N. E. 412 (1932);
Franklin National Bank v. Kennerly Coal and Coke Co., 300 Pa. 479, 150
Atl. 902 (1930).
7. See note 4, supra.
8. The state court could not dispute the federal court's assumption of
jurisdiction since an appeal from the order appointing the federal receiver
was never perfected and was dismissed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
9. U. S. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2 (1); 1 STAT. 76 (1789), 28 U. S. C.
§ 41 (1) (1926).
10. S. C. CiV. CODn (1932) §§ 7855, 7868.
11. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270 (U. S.
1871); Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S.
239 (1905); Guardian Savings and Trust Co. v. Road Improvement District
No. 7, 267 U. S. 1 (1925); Grover v. Merritt Development Co., 7 F. (2d) 917
(D. Minn. 1925). Situations where the state has provided particular ad-
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remedy through the appointment of a receiver to sue in their behalf cannot be
restricted by the state to its own courts.12
A state court may, of course, under certain circumstances, refuse to entertain
a suit brought by a foreig;, federal or state equity receiver.18 Whether it
should refuse to entertain such suit generally depends upon its own notions
of comity.14 But the scope of the receiver's powers, whether he is to represent
ministrative proceedings, as in the case of Workmen's Compensation statutes,
would probably be without the scope of this doctrine.
12. It is true that a majority of courts have, in the absence of statute,
denied the receiver the right to enforce the stockholders' double liability on the
ground that such liability is not an asset of the corporation but a collateral
liability flowing directly to the creditors and enforceable only by them. Alsop
v. Conway, 188 Fed. 568 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911); Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Il1.
409, 116 N. E. 273 (1917); Hammond v. Cline, 170 Ind. 452, 84 N. E. 827
(1908); Bradley v. Aimar, 140 S. C. 14, 138 S. E. 401 (1927); TIOMPSON,
CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 5178. A few courts have permitted the receiver
to enforce the double liability by calling it a corporate asset. Howarth v.
Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 56 N. E. 489 (1900); Pyles v. Carney, 85 W. Va. 159,
101 S. E. 174 (1919). Or by considering it a trust fund for all creditors to
be ratably distributed by the receiver. McNeill v. Pace, 69 Fla. 349, 68 So.
177 (1915); Rogers v. Selleck, 117 Neb. 569, 221 N. W. 702 (1928). Even
assuming that on this matter a federal court is bound by the decisions of the
court of the state in which it is sitting, contrary to the decision in Swift v. Tyson,
16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842), yet once a state statute has made the liability suffi-
ciently an asset of the estate to permit suit by a state court receiver, or once
the state has removed the obstacle to suit by a receiver appointed in a state
court, the state cannot prevent the federal courts from affording a similar
remedy to persons entitled to seek it there. Guardian Savings and Trust Co.
v. Road Improvement District No. 7, 267 U. S. 1 (1925).
13. An equity receiver ordinarily has no right to sue beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the appointing court. Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854);
Sterrett v. Second National Bank of Cincinnati, 248 U. S. 73 (1918); FlaackQ
v. Winona Mills Co., 104 Conn. 665, 134 Atl. 265 (1926). But where the law
of the appointing forum confers title to the assets upon the receiver he may
sue as of right in a foreign jurisdiction. Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222 (1880) ;
Hopkins v. Lancaster, 254 Fed. 190 (N. D. Ala. 1918); Irvine v. Baker, 225
Fed. 834 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); Hirning v. Hamlin, 200 Iowa 1322, 206 N. W.
617 (1925). However, in the principal case it may be doubted whether the
state and federal courts were foreign to each other so that the federal receiver
could be denied the right to sue in the state court, for courts having the same
territorial jurisdiction are not generally considered foreign jurisdictions. Grant
v. A. B. Leach Co., 280 U. S. 351 (1930); Shull v. Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
81 W. Va. 184, 94 S. E. 123 (1917); see Dickinson v. Chesapeake Ry., 7 W.
Va. 390, 416 (1874). Contra: Olney v. Tanner, 10 Fed. 101 (S. D. N. Y. 1882).
14. The federal courts usually refuse to allow a foreign receiver to sue.
Great Western Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 561 (1905);
Fowler v. Osgood, 141 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); Fairview Fluor Spar &
Lead Co. v. Ulrich, 192 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 7th, 1911). But state courts usually
allow the suit on grounds of comity. Stevens v. Tilden, 122 Minn. 250, 142
N. W. 315 (1913) ; Van Kempen v. Latham, 195 N. C. 389, 142 S. E. 322 (1928) ;
Cole v. Sassenberry, 56 S. D. 595, 230 N. W. 22 (1930). Such suit is not
allowed, however, when the rights of resident creditors would be prejudiced.
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both the corporation and the creditors or to sue upon causes of action be-
longing to the former but not upon those belonging to the latter, is a question
to be determined solely by the appointing court whose officer he is.15 The
privilege of another court to refuse its own facili "es for the exercise of that
power is not equivalent to a capacity to deny its existence or prohibit its
exercise entirely.
PREFERENTIL TREATMENT OF FUNDS DEPosrrT UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACr
IN In re Warre7's Bank' the Wisconsin Banking Commissioner applied for a
declaration that certain funds held by the bank to the credit of the Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company constituted a general de-
posit. Every two weeks during a period of more than nine years the railroad
had sent a sufficient amount of currency to the bank to meet the pay checks
which it had issued to its employees at Tomah, Wisconsin, where the bank was
located. These checks were always drawn on the railroad's metropolitan de-
positaries. After all the checks had been presented to the bank and paid by
it the cashier indorsed and returned them to the treasurer of the railroad
together with a remittance for as much of the money forwarded by the
company as had not been paid out, and closed the account Thus the checks
never passed through the clearing house. The bank became insolvent after
it had received a shipment of currency but before all the pay checks had been
presented and paid. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed an order deny-
ing the Commissioner's application and directing him to pay the railroad the
funds which had not been paid out, on the ground that they constituted a
specific deposit and that the bank never took title to them but acted merely
as the railroad's agent or trustee. That the cash had been mingled with
the general assets of the bank was regarded as immaterial.
Where a specific chattel or specific moneys are deposited with a bank and
it agrees to return the identical chattel or moneys, the bank is a bailee and
the arrangement is called a special deposit.2  Where moneys are deposited
in a bank and it agrees to hold them in trust for the depositor, the bank is
a trustee and the arrangement is called a trust?3 But where moneys are
deposited in a bank which agrees to return an equivalent amount, or to pay
over an equivalent amount to a person or persons designated by the depositor,
or to apply an equivalent sum to a particular purpose, or to do anything else
except hold in trust or return the identical moneys, the bank is a debtor and
Lackman v. Supreme Council 0. C. F., 142 Cal. 22, 75 Pac. 583 (1904) ; Flaache
v. Winona Mills, supra note 13; Catlin v. Wilcox, 123 Ind. 477, 24 N. E. 250
(1889). For a full discussion see Laughlin, The Extraftcrritorial Powcr of
Receivers (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 429; Note (1930) 4 So. CAL. REv. 146.
15. Evans v. Nellis, 187 U. S. 271 (1902); Converse v. Hamilton, 224
U. S. 243 (1912); Gruetzmacher v. Quevli, 208 Iowa 537, 226 N. W. 5 (1929).
1. 244 N. W. 594 (Wis. 1932).
2. Bloomheart v. Foster, 114 Kan. 786, 221 Pac. 279 (1923); State v. BicL-
ford, 28 N. D. 36, 147 N. W. 407 (1914); 1 MoRsp, BANKS AND BAN=m o (6th
ed. 1928) § 183.
3. Grossman v. Taylor, 185 Ark. 64, 46 S. W. (2d) 13 (1932); Monticello
v. Citizens State Bank, 180 Minn. 418, 230 N. W. 889 (1930); Mothersead
v. Lewis, 117 Okla. 167, 245 Pac. 550 (1925).
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the transaction is a general deposit.4 If the bank becomes insolvent the
return which the depositor will receive is directly related to the classification
of his claim as a bailment, a trust, or a general deposit. 5
All general depositors, however, are not treated uniformly. For example,
where it could be argued that the funds were intrusted to the bank for a
particular purpose,6 general depositors have been accorded preferences. In
such cases the claim has been variously called a trust,1 a special deposit,8
or a specific deposit. 9 Nor have the courts been consistent in granting or
denying preferences in outwardly similar fact situations. Thus, where the
claimant has intrusted funds to a bank for transmission contrary results have
been reached.' 0 And, although courts often rely upon the presence or absence
of certain particular considerations as bases for their conclusions, an exam-
ination of the cases reveals that this reliance has not led to consistent results.
The question of the segregation from the general assets of the bank of the
funds deposited is one of the considerations to which courts have looked. But
some courts have been unwilling to grant a preference to the depositor unles
the funds have been set aside.11 On the other hand, an understanding that
4. Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 135 S. W. 896 (1911); Mutual Accident
Association v. Jacobs, 141 Ill. 261, 31 N. E. 414 (1892); 1 MonsE, op. oit.
supra note 2, § 186.
5. A general depositor must ordinarily share pro rata with the other credi-
tors. 2 MORSE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 629.
6. As, for example, where the deposit is to be used by the bank to buy
bonds for the customer or to pay a specific obligation of the customer which
the bank is collecting for the obliger.
7. Ryan v. Phillips, 3 Kan. App. 704, 44 Pac. 909 (1896); Blythe v. Kujawa,
175 Minn. 88, 220 N. W. 168 (1928); Kimmel v. Dickson, 5 S. D. 221, 58
N. W. 561 (1894).
8. Stein v. Kemp, 132 Minn. 44, 155 N. W. 1052 (1916); HIeckstall v. Citi-
-ens Bank of Windsor, 202 N. C. 350, 163 S. E. 107 (1932); North West
Ilumber Co. v. Scandinavian American Bank of Seattle, 130 Wash. 33, 225
Pac. 825 (1924).
9. Montagu v. Pacific Bank, 81 Fed. 602 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1897); City
of Miami v. Shutts, 59 Fla. 462, 51 So. 929 (1910); Woodhouse v. Crandall,
197 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902).
10. Preference granted: Bryan v. Cocoanut Grove Bank and Trust Co.,
101 Fla. 947, 132 So. 481 (1931); Winkler v. Veigel, 176 Minn. 384, 223 N. W.
622 (1929). Preference denied: People v. California Safe Deposit and Trust
Co., 23 Cal. App. 199, 137 Pac. 1111 (1913); Matter of Littman, 258 N. Y.
468, 180 N. E. 174 (1932). The same divergence is evident in other situations.
1). Deposit for payment of note at maturity. Preference granted: Central
Bank and Trust Co. v. Ritchie, 120 Wash. 160, 206 Pac. 926 (1922). Preference
denied: Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913). 2). Deposit
to have bank buy bonds for customer. Preference granted: Secrest v. Ladd,
112 Kan. 23, 209 Pac. 824 (1922). Preference denied: Howland v. People,
229 Ill. App. 23 (1923). 3). Deposit to meet pay roll. Preference granted:
Central Coal and Coke Co. v. State Bank of Bevier, 226 Mo. App. 594, 44
S. W. (2d) 188 (1931). Preference denied: Northern Sugar Corp. v. Thomp-
son, 13 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
11. Pacific States Savings and Loan Co. v. Commercial State Bank, 40
Idaho 481, 269 Pac. 86 (1928); Howland v. People, supra note 10; Mississippi
[Vol. 421126 YALE LAW JOURNAL
the funds are not to be used in the regular course of the bank's business has
often been considered sufficient even though no segregation actually took
place.12 And in some instances preferences have been granted where the
funds were not set aside and it was apparent that the bank intended to use
them in the course of its business. 13
Whether or not the bank's assets have been augmented by the deposit is
another consideration on which the courts have based their decisions and
which has led to conflicting results. In some instances it has been held that
a mere transfer of credits on the books of the bank is not a sufficient aug-
mentation of assets in the hands of the receiver to justify a preference,14
and in others that the issuance to the bank of a check drawn on the depositor's
checking account is such an augmentation. 15 Nor does the circumstance that
the depositor had a right to draw checks against the fund furnish a conclusive
indication that a preference will be withheld. In some instances the exdstence
of such a right has resulted in the denial of a preference; 10 in others the
right was considered immaterial and a preference was granted.17
That these considerations have not led to uniform results is entirely under-
standable. The dialectic of abstract legal analysis offers no sufficiently per-
suasive reason why a court should permit a preference merely because funds
Central Railroad v. Conner, 114 Miss. 63, 75 So. 57 (1917). These cases
apparently rest on the theory that there must be an identifiable rca upon
-which the trust is to be impressed.
12. Titlow v. Sundquist, 234 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 9th, 191G); Parker v.
Central Bank and Trust Co. of Ashville, 202 N. C. 230, 162 S. E. 564 (1932);
First National Bank of Ranger v. Price, 262 S. W. 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
Many cases reaching this conclusion are based on the ground that co-mingling
makes no difference. Marshall v. Farmers and Merchants Bank of Steele, 215
Mo. App. 365, 253 S. W. 15 (1923); North West Lumber Co. v. Scandinavian
American Bank of Seattle, supra note 8. Or that the bank should receive no
benefit from the wrongful conversion of the funds. Bryan v. Cocoanut Grove
Bank and Trust Co., supra note 10; Kimmel v. Dickson, mepra note 7. But
it is to be noted that upon the bank's insolvency the general creditors and
not the bank would benefit by a denial of the preference.
13. Where bank paid interest for the use of the money: Newsom v. Acacia
Mutual Life Association, 136 So. 389 (Fla. 1931); Blummer v. Scandinavian
American State Bank of Badger, 169 Mlinn. 89, 210 N. W. 865 (1926). Where
bank was apparently to receive no compensation for its services: Greenfield
v. Clarence Savings Bank, 5 S. W. (2d) 708 (Mo. App. 1928); Plano Manu-
facturing Co. v. Auld, 14 S. D. 512, 86 N. W. 21 (1901).
14. Phoenix Title and Trust Co. v. Central Bank of Phoenix, 30 Ariz. 431,
247 Pac. 1097 (1926); People v. California Safe Deposit and Trust Co.;
Matter of Littman, both supra note 10.
15. Stoller v. Coates, 88 Mo. 514 (1885); Bryan v. Cocoanut Grove Bank
and Trust Co.; Winkler v. Veigel; Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Ritchie,
all supra note 10.
16. Northern Sugar Corp. v. Thompson, supra note 10; Campion v. Big
Stone County Bank, 177 Blinn. 51, 224 N. W. 258 (1929); Mississippi Central
Railroad v. Conner, supra note 11.
17. Central Coal and Coke Co. v. State Bank of Bevier, sitpra note 10;
First National Bank of Ranger v. Price, supra note 12.
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have not been mingled,' 8 or assets augmented,' 9 or because depositors may
not draw checks; 20 nor for denying a preference merely because funds have
been mingled,21 or assets not augmented,22 or because depositors may draw
checks. 23 The problem of granting and denying preferences is really one
of deciding whether or not distinctions shall be made among creditors of a
single class. If there be any basis for making distinctions between them It
must be found in the particular circumstances giving rise to their respective
claims. It is true that the above considerations deserve some weight; but
the real determinant is whether or not the granting of a preference will deprive
the estate of assets which the general creditors might reasonably have believed
would be available for distribution to them.
In the principal case, therefore, the decision is wholly justified. Since the
bank was a small one and could not have met the railroad's pay checks with
its own cash, it must have used a large part of the identical currency received
to accomplish the purpose. Moreover, since the bank received the cash only
a day or two before the checks were presented and since the amount which
was not used was remitted as soon as all the checks had been presented, the
money which the railroad sent the bank never became part of its general assets,
notwithstanding the fact that it may have been mingled with them. Con-
sequently, the general creditors had no reason to believe that they would
receive a dividend out of the money remaining from the railroad's shipment
of currency.
PRIORITIES BmrwEHN CREDITORS AND CLAIMANTS UNDER STOo1 REPUROHASn
AGREEMENTS
A FORMER stockholder sought to file proof of claim with the receiver of an
insolvent corporation for instalments due him under a stock repurchase agree-
ment which provided inter alia that the claimant might retain his stock upon
returning the instalments paid. At the date the contract was made, eight
years before, the corporation had ample assets to satisfy all creditors despite
the contemplated capital reduction, and the other stockholders assented to the
plan. The Court of Chancery of New Jersey 1 held that the repurchase
agreement was valid; that the claimant had changed his status from stock-
18. Phoenix Title and Trust Co. v. Central Bank of Phoenix, sipre note
14; Washington Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Duke, 126 Wash. 510, 218 Pac.
232 (1923).
19. Leach v. Burton and Co. State Bank, 206 Iowa 675, 220 N. W. 113
(1928); Pacific States Savings and Loan Co. v. Commercial State Banc;
Mississippi Central Railroad v. Conner, both supra note 11.
20. Brennan v. Tillinghast, supra note 10; Schofield Manufacturing Co.
v. Cochran, 119 Ga. 901, 47 S. E. 208 (1904); Mattes v. Cantley, 39 S. W.
(2d) 412 (Mo. App. 1931).
21. See cases cited notes 12 and 13, supra.
22. Star Cutter Co. v. Smith, 37 I1. App. 212 (1890); Shopert v. Indiana
National Bank, 41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515 (1908); Townsend v. Athelstan
Bank, 212 Iowa 1078, 237 N. W. 356 (1931).
23. See note 17, supra.
1. Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 163 Atl. 140 (N. J. 1932).
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holder to creditor despite his option to rescind the contract; and that he should
be permitted to share pro rata with the corporation's general creditors.C
If, as in the instant case, a stock repurchase agreement is not fraudulent
and does not render the corporation insolvent, money paid out pursuant to
the contract can not be recovered back from the vendor for the benefit of
corporate creditors upon subsequent insolvency.3 And if the agreement is
executory, it is generally enforceable by the former stockholder against the
corporation, if at the time of his suit for collection the company has a surplus
equal to the amount of his claim.4 But if the corporation is insolvent at the
time payment is sought or would be rendered insolvent by payment, most
courts, contrary to the present decision, have not allowed former stockholders
whose claims are founded on executory stock repurchase contracts to share
pro rata with the general creditors.5u It is apparently immaterial whether the
claim is based upon notes given for the stock or simply upon an agreement
to repurchase.6 In a few instances the reason given has been the existence
of a statute expressly forbidding the repurchase of its own stock by a cor-
poration except with surplus; 7 but usually courts have invoked the doctrine
that the capital stock of a corporation upon insolvency is a trust fund to be
2. A New Jersey corporation has the right to buy in its own stock for a
legitimate corporate purpose. Berger v. United States Steel Corp., 63 N. J.
Eq..809, 53 At. 68 (1902); Oliver v. Rahway Ice Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 596, 54
At. 460 (1903). The right of a corporation to repurchase its own stock has
been fully discussed. See Wormser, The Power of a Corporation to Acquire
its Own Stock (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 177; Note (1914) 27 HAIM. L. REV. 747;
11 FiECHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Permanent Ed. 1932) § 5148.
The court determined that the repurchase in the instant case was for a
legitimate corporate purpose since at that time it furthered the best interests
of the corporation.
3. Tierney v. Butler, 1"44 Iowa 553, 123 N. W. 213 (1909); Joseph v. Raf,
82 App. Div. 47, 81 N. Y. Supp. 546 (1st Dep't 1903), affd, 176 N. Y. 611, 68
N. E. 1118 (1903). Cf. Coleman v. Tepel, 230 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916);
Jesson v. Noyes, 245 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917), cert. de, 245 U. S. 667
(1917), 247 U. S. 512 (1918); Crandall v. Lincoln, 62 Conn. 13 (1884); Clapp
v. Peterson, 104 Ill. 26 (1882); Atlanta & Walworth Butter & Cheese Asso-
ciation v. Smith, 141 Wis. 377, 123 N. W. 106 (1909). Insolvency is used in
the equity or bankruptcy sense.
4. Lumber Co. v. Telephone Co., 127 Iowa 350, 101 N. W. 742 (1904);
Richards v. Wiener Co., 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912); see Cross v.
Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929); Note (1928) 26 BIcH. L. Ruv.
790; Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 902; cf. Miles, Stockholders as General
Creditors (1928) 17 Ky. L. J. 3. By surplus is merely meant the amount by
which the assets exceed the liabilities including the stated capital stock.
5. Keith v. Kilmer, 261 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919), cert. den., 252 U. S.
578 (1920); Matthews Bros. v. Pullen, 268 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 1st, 1920);
Clark v. Clark Machine Co., 151 Mich. 416, 115 N. W. 416 (1908); cf. Olmstead
v. Vance & Jones Co., 196 Ill. 236, 63 N. E. 634 (1902); Rider v. Delker &
Sons Co., 145 Ky. 634, 140 S. W. 1011 (1911). But see First Trust Co. v.
Illinois Central Rr. Co., 256 Fed. 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
6. See cases cited note 5, supra.
7. In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914), cert. don.,
234 U. S. 760 (1914); Richards v. Wiener Co.; Cross v. Beguelin, both supra
note 4.
administered for the benefit of creditors, and have refused to class as creditors
claimants under stock repurchase agreements.8
The question of priority presented in such cases, however, should not be
determined by the arbitrary application of any rule to all cases nor to all
creditors in a single case. For example, a distinction should in some cases
be drawn between the rights of those who advanced credit before the stock
repurchase agreement and those who became creditors thereafter. The claims
of the former should always be preferred to claims arising later from executory
contracts to repurchase; for such creditors advanced their money relying upon
a stated amount of capital of which the contributions of the withdrawing
stockholders were a part.9 On the other hand, the claims of persons who gave
credit to the corporation after the stock repurchase agreement should not be
preferred to the claims of withdrawing stockholders if adequate notice of the
repurchase agreement was afforded them. But if the consequent reduction
of capital is not displayed on the balance sheet of the corporation, the
probability that, in the absence of actual notice, subsequent creditors were
misled as to the company's true financial condition should require a preference
in their favor.' 0 Ordinarily there would not be sufficient notice if the stock
repurchase agreement was merely carried on the books of the corporation as
a liability." At least one court has recognized these distinctions and refused
to allow creditors with notice to enforce their claims ahead of mortgagees who
received bonds in return for stock of the corporation.
12
In the principal case there was a further consideration which, it may be
argued, demanded a result contrary to that reached, although the court
apparently did not take it into account.18 If a stockholder, upon entering a
repurchase agreement, wishes to be classed as a creditor upon insolvency, it
should be apparent that he has irrevocably changed his position from that of
shareholder to that of creditor. He should not be permitted, as was the
claimant in the instant case, to retain for himself the dual benefits of stock-
8. Keith v. Kilmer; Olmstead v. Vance & Jones Co.; Clark v. Clark Machine
Co., all supra note 5.
9. From the point of view of such creditors, there is a plain distinction
between a subsequent creditor and a claimant under a stock repurchase
contract. The subsequent creditor has advanced additional funds to the cor-
poration, but the retiring stockholder has merely depleted, or attempted to
deplete, by the amount of his repurchase claim, the capital upon the security
of which the existing creditors relied.
10. It is not to be implied that the repurchase agreement should be wholly
invalidated. In any event the former shareholders should be allowed to en-
force their claims before stockholders existing at the time the claim is presented
are allowed to participate in the distribution of assets. Van Brocklin v. Queen
City Printing Co., 19 Wash. 552, 53 Pac. 822 (1898).
11. If the transaction is recorded merely as a debt, although the sum of the
corporation's liabilities will be accurate, the creditor will be deceived as to
the amount of "cushion" of capital stock upon which he may rely.
12. First Trust Co. v. Illinois Central Rr. Co., supra note 5; see Cross v.
Beguelin, supra note 4.
13. Speaking of the repurchase contract the court said: "... it converted
him at once into a creditor and not a stockholder, although there was a clause
giving him the opportunity to repurchase the stock . . ." Supra note 1,
at 141.
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holder and creditor by reserving an option to buy the stock back from the
corporation merely by returning the money received.
24
ExTRATERRIToRIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TAX CLAIM REDUCED TO JUDGMENT
THE State of New York brought suit against a New Jersey corporation doing
business in New York for the collection of a franchise tax. Jurisdiction was
obtained and judgment rendered for the state. Subsequently, the state insti-
tuted suit in New Jersey to recover on the judgment. Plaintiff's motion to
strike out defendant's answer was granted.l The court admitted that an
action for the collection of foreign taxes is not ordinarily maintainable, but
held that the original character of the claim had here been merged in the
judgment of the New York court and that full faith and credit should be
accorded it.
Historically, the refusal to enforce foreign tax claims is explained on the
theory that the English courts considered such enforcement injurious to local
commerce.
2  More recently it has been suggested 3 that a state should not
enforce a foreign tax suit because of the additional burden thereby placed
upon its courts and the difficulties attendant upon the assessment of a tax
in conformity with complex foreign revenue statutes. In addition, the very
nature of the tax might be inconsistent with established local policy.4  But
it may be questioned whether these arguments are applicable to the situation
in the principal case, where the tax claim was reduced to judgment in the
foreign state, since the local court would have to consider only matters of
jurisdiction or defenses which might be raised on collateral attack in the
taxing state.5
Causes of action of a penal nature are also unenforceable in a foreign
jurisdiction.0 But despite some text writers who state the contraryJ suits
in one state for the enforcement of a judgment rendered in another state upon
14. Cf. Note (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 80; Berl, Creditors and Stock-
holders (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 814.
1. People of State of New York v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 162 At. 872
(N. J. 1932).
2. Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 782.
3. Cf. Foley, S., in Matter of Martin's Estate, 136 Misc. 51, 54, 240 N. Y.
Supp. 393, 396 (Sur. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 255 N. Y. 359, 174 N. E. 753 (1931).
The Supreme Court in Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U. S. 18, 24 (1930), refused
to pass upon the question whether a federal court in one state should enforce
state revenue statutes of another. In one instance a state was allowed to
file a claim for a franchise tax with a receiver appointed in another state
to liquidate corporate assets. Holshouser Co. v. Gold Hill Copper Co., 138
N. C. 248, 50 S. E. 650 (1905).
4. See L. Hand, J., concurring in Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) G00, 604
(C. C. A. 2d, 1929), aff'd, 281 U. S. 18 (1930).
5. See Hampton v. McConnell, 16 U. S. 234 (1818).
6. WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 4; MInO0, CONFLICT 01
LAws (1901) § 10.
7. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 204; 3 FRE.MN, JUDGw.1ENTs
(5th ed. 1925) § 1360. But see 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS (1891) § 871.
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such causes of action have been allowed,8 and more recently approved, by state
tribunals.9  And the Supreme Court has never directly decided whether or
not a judgment, based either on a penal or revenue claim, must be given full
faith and credit in a sister state.' 0 In Huntington v. Attrill,11 the plaintiff
in effect brought a suit on a New York judgment in Maryland. The defense
was that the original suit was founded on a penal cause of action and was
therefore unenforceable in any state but New York. The Supreme Court
decided in favor of the plaintiff, but in placing its decision on the ground
that the original cause of action was not of a penal nature, 'the court inti-
mated that the fact that the suit was based on a judgment was immaterial. 12
In Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Company,13 the statement was made that
even if suit were brought upon a previous judgment, a foreign state could
not entertain it if the original action were of a penal nature or to enforce
a tax claim.14 However, the force of the dictum in the Pelican case has been
considerably weakened by later expressions of the court apparently requiring
a more rigid adherence to the full faith and credit clause.10 Furthermore,
the Court has subsequently stated that in a suit on a judgment of a sister
state, where valid jurisdiction has been obtained, only such defenses are allow-
able as would be maintainable after final judgment in the state whore it was
rendered.16 And the Court has recently decided that the fact that an original
suit on a cause of action arising in a foreign jurisdiction would not be main-
tainable in local tribunals is no justification for a refusal to give full faith
and credit to a suit brought on the claim after it has been reduced to judg-
ment in the foreign state.IT.
The historical ground for denying enforcement of foreign tax claims has,
of course, disappeared as between the several states. Moreover, the present
concentration of wealth in the form of intangibles easily transported across
state lines has rendered more difficult the problem of enforcement.18 These
considerations, in addition to the immediate and pressing need of the states
8. Schuler v. Schuler, 209 Ill. 522, 71 N. E. 16 (1904); State of Indiana
v. Helmer, 21 Iowa 370 (1866); Healy v. Root, 28 Mass. 389 (1831); Spencer
v. Brockway, 1 Ohio 259 (1824). Contra: Arkansas v. Bowen, 3 App. D. C.
537 (1894).
9. Halsey v. McLean, 94 Mass. 438, 440 (1866); Symons v. Eichelberger,
110 Ohio St. 224, 239, 144 N. E. 279, 283 (1924).
10. Cf. GOODRICH, loc. cit. supra note 7.
11. 146 U. S. 657 (1892).
12. However, the court may have wished to place its decision on this ground
in order to limit the meaning of the word "penal" and thus restrict the non-
-enforcement of such claims.
13. 127 U. S. 265 (1888).
14. Id. at 290.
15. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908); Bradford Electric Light
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932); cf. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fo Ry.
Co. v. Nichols, 264 U. S. 348 (1924); James-Dickinson Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S.
119 (1927).
16. Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 (1928); Note (1928) 28 CoL. L.
REv. 659.
17. Kenney v. Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S. 411 (1920); Comment
(1919) 28 YALE L. J. 264.
18. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmcntal Claims
(1932) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 193, 216.
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for revenue, might well outweigh the traditional opposition to extraterritorial
enforcement of tax claims. Clearly at least, the constitutional mandate of
full faith and credit affords ample support for the enforcement by a local
court of such claim when it has been first reduced to judgment in the taxing
state.
IMMUNITY FROm DOUBLE LIABIm OF NoMINEE OWNING BANK STocx
FOR CORPORATION
THE Globe Financial Corporation, a bank stock holding company,' held in
1930 a controlling stock interest in four national banks.2  To avoid the
technical difficulties incident to a corporation's purchase and sale of stock, the
corporation established a partnership consisting of its principal officers and
directors 3 to hold its bank stock. The partnership had no capital, and no
partner was to claim any beneficial interest in the securities held. In 1931
one of the banks controlled by the Globe Financial Corporation became in-
solvent, and an assessment equal to the par value of their shares was levied
against the shareholders. In an action in which the bank's receiver sought
to recover this assessment from the partners as nominal holders of the share
owned by the corporation, the court determined that since there was neither
co-ownership, nor a business, nor any profit sharing, no partnership existed;
and that therefore the defendants could not be assessed.4
The slow and cumbersome procedure which has been developed for the
transfer of corporate stock has arisen from the burden placed upon corporations
for wrongful transfers. A corporation transferring shares of its stock on its
books when the owner of the stock lacked power to sell it, or did not authorize
the sale, may be required to re-issue to the owner an equal number of shares
or to pay him their value.5  The liability thus imposed on the corporation is
absolute, 6 the exercise of due care not being a defense. If the corporation has
delegated the transferring of its stock to a bank or trust company as transfer
agent, the latter may be held liable for an unlawful transfer either to its
corporate principal, or directly to the stock owner.7 To protect themselves
from such liability, corporations and their transfer agents ordinarily demand
of a vendor of stock clear proof of his power and authority to sell.
8 When
1. For a discussion of bank holding companies see BONBRXGIIT AND MRANS,
THE HOLDING COMPANY (1932) at 319.
2. MOODY, BANxs, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE, INV.STMENT TRUST (1931)
at 2648.
3. Ibid.
4. Schumacker v. Davis, 1 F. Supp. 959 (E. D. N. Y. 1932). A partnership
is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit. N. Y. PART. LAW (1919) § 10.
5. BAILANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 151.
6. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369 (1878);
Mackenzie v. Engelhard Co., 266 U. S. 131 (1924).
7. Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Atl. 844 (1917);
Clarkson Home v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co., 182 N. Y. 47, 74 N. E.
571 (1905); Elliott, Transfer Agents and Registrars (1931) 4 So. CAMW. REV.
203.
8. Clarkson Home v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co., stpra note 7, at
54, 74 N. E. at 575.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the vendor-is a corporation, the authority of its agents and officers is usually
evidenced by a certified copy of resolutions adopted by the board of directors
authorizing" the transfers; by a certified copy of the resolutions appointing
or electing the officers who sign the certificates in behalf of the corporation;
and by a certificate from the secretary to the effect that such resolutions as
are submitted are still in full force and effect on the date of transfer.9
These rules, which have been formulated by the New York Stock Transfer
Association and apparently accepted by the New York Stock ExchangelO have
proved too complex for use in present-day business transactions. To avoid
them many corporations have adopted the device of placing their stock in the
name of a nominee by whom transfers may be quickly and conveniently effected.
The partnership in the principal case was formed as such a nominee, in apparent
reliance upon the rule that no supporting documents are required for a transfer
of stock by a partnership.'1 The attempt by the insolvent bank's receiver to
hold the members of the fictitious partnership individually liable for the stock
assessment was a potential threat to the stock nominee device. In going out
of its way to protect the officers of the corporation by denying that a real
partnership had been created, the court in effect recognized that the rules
for the transfer of stock by corporations have become archaic. Perhaps a more
adequate method of meeting the problem would lie in a drastic modification of
those rules.
ASSIGNABILITY OF EASEMENT APPURTENANT TO CONTEMPLATED DOMINANT ESTATE
IN classifying particular easements as either assignable or non-assignable, courts
have long been accustomed to state their conclusions in terms of "easements
appurtenant" and "easements in gross." These labels, however, are of little
assistance in determining the assignability of an easement when the deed of
grant, in the light of surrounding facts, leaves the matter in doubt. In such
circumstances the courts endeavor to ascertain whether the intentions of the
parties were that the easement should be assignable. 1 Thus, if the parties
clearly intended to create an assignable easement, words of inheritance-2 and
9. CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) § 214. Such certificate need
not always be under the corporate seal. Hutchinson v. Rock Hill Real Estate
& Loan Co., 65 S. C. 45, 43 S. E. 295 (1902).
10. See Rules of the New York Stock Transfer Association discussed in
CHRISTY, loc. cit. supra note 9; see Rules of the New York Stock Exchange
reprinted in MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXOHANaES
(1931) 890.
11. CHRISTY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 217.
1. In practically every case involving the assignability of easements this is
stated. See, for example, Goodwillie Co. v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241
Ill. 42, 72, 89 N. E. 272, 283 (1909); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Griswold, 51 Ind. App. 497, 509, 97 N. E. 1030, 1034 (1912);
Weigold v. Bates, 144 Misc. 395, 397, 258 N. Y. Supp. 695, 698 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
That the easement is beneficial to the grantee's estate is, of course, evidence of
the parties' intent. See Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal. App. 554, 568, 229 Pac. 1002,
1007 (1924); Smith v. Garbe, 86 Neb. 91, 96, 124 N. W. 921, 923 (1910); of.
Burgas v. Stoutz, 174 La. 586, 141 So. 67 (1932).
2. Messenger v. Ritz, 345 Ill. 433, 178 N. E. 38 (1931).
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reference to the dominant estate 3 in the deed of grant are not essential; nor is
express mention of an easement intended to be assignable necessary in order
to pass the benefit 4 with a conveyance of the dominant estate and the burden
with the servient.5
This regard for the intentions of the parties is well illustrated in the recent
case of Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corporation.0 In 1902 the
promoter of a water power project secured from a landowner on the Susque-
hanna River a deed which granted the right of overflowing the grantor's land
by the erection of a dam to the promoter, his heirs and assigns, and released
them from all resulting damages. The deed was recorded, but the promoter
apparently took no steps to acquire a dam site or to build a dam, and in 1905
he assigned his rights to another. In 1930 the rights granted by the deed were
assigned to defendant, who immediately began to erect a dam. Plaintiff, a
remote assignee of the original grantor, prayed an injunction to restrain de-
fendant from overflowing his land without proper condemnation proceedings.
The court, emphasizing that the original parties apparently had intended to
create a permanent and assignable right, held that the deed granted an easement
appurtenant to the dam which the grantee expected to build. The injunction
was therefore refused.
The court's conclusion that the original parties intended to create an as-
signable right seems well justified, even if the fact that the grantee owned no
dominant estate were said to necessitate the conclusion that the easement was
in gross. The objection that such easements should not be assignable because
they may constitute unknown and hence irremovable clogs upon title7 would
not be available in this case since both the original grant and the subsequent
transfers of the easement were recorded. Nor would the danger of surcharge a
present a serious objection, since the fiowage right would be subject to the
3. Hopper v. Barnes, 113 Cal. 636, 45 Pac. 874 (1896); Nay v. Bernard, 40
Cal. App. 364, 180 Pac. 827 (1919); Goldstein v. Raskin, 271 IMI. 249, 111 N. E.
91 (1915); Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 80 N. W. 360 (1899); Tusi V.
Jacobsen, 134 Ore. 505, 293 Pac. 587 (1930).
4. Khouri v. Dappinian, 46 R. I. 163, 125 Atl. 268 (1924); see 2 TIFFNY,
REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 448. The easement must be in existence before
the conveyance. Duvall v. Ridout, 124 Md. 193, 92 Atl. 209 (1914).
5. See CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH
LAND" (1929) 52. But most courts state the rule as qualified by the necessity
of constructive notice from the recording of the deed. See Riddle v. Jones,
191 Ky. 763, 768, 231 S. W. 503, 506 (1921) ; Burgas v. Stoutz, sipra note 1, at
593, 141 So. at 69. If one estate derives from another an advantage of a
permanent and self-apparent character, the purchaser of the servient estate is
deemed to have "actual" notice. See Gulick v. Hamilton, 287 Ill. 367, 373, 122
N. E. 537, 539 (1919); Greve v. Caron, 233 Mich. 2G1, 267, 206 N. W. 334, 335
(1925). A gratuitous grantee assumes the burden without either constructive
or actual notice. Riddle v. Jones, supra.
6. 163 AtI. 159 (Pa. 1932).
7. This objection to the assignability of easements in gross is raised by
CLARK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 57-59.
8. See Comment by Professor Vance in (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 813, 817,
suggesting that easements in gross not open to surcharge have been held as-
signable. But see Simes, The Assignability of Eascments in Gross in American
Law (1924) 22 MICH. L. REv. 521, 524; and CLARK, op. cit. stpra note 5, at
60-64.
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same limitations in the hands of an assignee as it would be in those of the
original grantee. But the court did not find it necessary thus to meet the
objections to the assignment of an easement in gross. Clearly, the parties
intended to create a right which by its very nature could not be personal to
the grantee, but was incident and beneficial only to the dam which the parties
expected to be built. The court's declaration that the easement was attached
to the dam as a contemplated dominant estate therefore appears sound, though
authority for the recognition of such a dominant estate is lacking.0 It seems
possible, however, that the court could have reached the same result without
discussing the distinction between easements appurtenant and in gross,10 on
the ground that the parties expected the flowage rights to be assigned before
being exercised 11 and that the deed was intended primarily to bind the grantor's
assignees to release the owners of the right from damages caused by its future
exercise. 12
AvAILABILITY OF TENTATIVE TRUST FUND FOR PAYMENT OF
TESTAmENTARY EXPENSES OF DEPosIToR
JuDIcrAL desire to uphold savings bank deposits made by one person in trust
for another as a convenient method of disposing of small estates without the
necessity of compliance with testamentary requirements, has found expression
in the highly elaborate tentative trust doctrine.1 Varying situations presented
9. But cf. Gardner v. San Gabriel Valley Bank, 7 Cal. App. 106, 93 Pac.
900 (1907) (easement intended to be appurtenant to a second story not yet
built; upheld as appurtenant to the land); Nash v. Eliot Street Garage Co.,
236 Mass. 176, 128 N. E. 10 (1920) (right of way attached to occupants of
certain houses erected subsequent to time of grant); Pioneer Sand and Gravel
Co. v. Seattle Construction and Dry Dock Co., 102 Wash. 608, 173 Pac. 608
(1918) (contract for creation of future easement enforced against assignee as
an equitable covenant running with the land, but dominant estate apparently
existed when contract was made).
10. Cf. Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 Atl. 351 (1924).
11. See Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 445, 125 N. 11.
834, 839 (1920), where it was held that since the parties in the written instrument
expressly contemplated that the rights granted were to be transferred to plaintiff,
the rule of non-assignability of easements in gross did not apply. In the principal
case the court might have inferred such an understanding from the terms of the
deed, or taken judicial notice of the fact that power dams are generally erected
by corporations rather than by individuals.
12. See Tide Water Pipe Co. v. Bell, supra note 10, at 113, 124 Atl. at 354.
1. In Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 125, 71 N. E. 748, 752 (1904), the
New York theory of tentative trusts is expounded as follows: "A deposit
by one person of his own money in his own name as trustee for another, stand-
ing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the
depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor
dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declara-
tion, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the beneficiary. In ease
the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive
act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute
trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor."
For a fuller and more exhaustive discussion of the New York doctrine of
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by constant litigation on these trusts have forced the courts to become in-
creasingly technical in their efforts to preserve the intention of the depositor.2
An example of the doctrinal manipulations which are used to reach a desirable
result is found in the recent case of Matter of Sicgelbaum,3 in which the
funeral and administration expenses of the intestate were charged against
a savings bank deposit made by the intestate in trust for another, because
the general assets of the estate in the hands of the administrator were other-
wise insufficient. The court, admitting that "candor compels the concession
that it [the tentative trust theory] amounts to a judicial addition to the mode
permitted by Section 21 of the Decedent Estate Law for the transmission of
property on death," declared in effect that the ordinary rules governing such
transfers should apply. Payment of the expenses in question out of the sav-
ings account was therefore justified by analogizing the deposit in trust to
a specific bequest which would be available for testamentary expenses where
the balance of the estate was insufficient to pay them. "For those, however,
to whom such a frank recognition of the verities of the nature of the trans-
action would be abhorrent," the court reached the same result on the basis
of the tentative trust theory by reasoning that the presumption of an absolute
trust arising at the death of the depositor without a prior revocation was
rebutted to the extent necessary to pay reasonable funeral and administration
expenses.
Upon the death of a depositor of money in a savings bank in trust for
another, the creditors of the depositor may seek payment of their claims out
of this fund,4 even though, according to the tentative trust theory, the trust
becomes absolute at that moment. The depositor has a right to the absolute
disposition of the fund, since he may revoke the trust at any time before
death by "some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance" 5 or mahe any
withdrawals without subjecting the estate to liability to the beneficiary.0 The
depositor, therefore, is regarded as being under a duty to apply this fund
to the payment of claims of creditors existing during his lifetime, since to
hold otherwise would permit him to place his property beyond the reach of
his creditors.
This proposition, however, furnishes no authority for a similar result in
the case of claims arising out of testamentary expenses. These claims, having
come into existence after the death of the depositor, do not constitute debts
of the deceased. Consequently, were there no pre-existing creditors, the deposi-
tor would practice no fraud by a disposition of his property through the use
of the savings bank trust device. The court, therefore, finding itself without
tentative trusts, see Larremore, Judicial Legislation i2t Ncto York (1905)
14 YALn L. J. 312, 315; Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1930) 43 HAnv.
L. REv. 521, 539; Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1133; Comment (1933) 81
U. op PA. L. Rnv. 737.
2. For instance, the execution of a will inconsistent with the existence of
the trust is considered a sufficient revocation, even though the trust is said
to become absolute upon the death of the testator, at which time the will also
takes effect. In re Murray's Estate, 143 Misc. 499, 250 N. Y. Supp. 815
(Sur. Ct. 1932); Note (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 141.
3. N. Y. L. X., Mar. 1, 1933, at 1226.
4. Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529
(2d Dep't 1908).
5. Matter of Totten, supra note 1.
6. Ibid.
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support for the precise situation involved in the instant case, was forced to
adopt an admittedly complex rationalization to make the only equitable dis-
tribution of the fund.
ELECTION OF INTESTATE SHARE BY SURVIVING SPOUSE IN ABSENCE o
TESTAMENTARY GIFT.
A NEW complication arising under § 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law
was considered in a recent case, thus adding to the slowly growing collection
of precedent established since the statute was given new form in 1929.1 Under
the provisions of the amended law, the surviving spouse of a testator is
accorded the right to elect an intestate share against the terms of the decedent's
will, upon compliance with certain prescribed formalities.2 In the instant case
a widow, who had received nothing under her husband's will, failed to file a
personal notice of election to take her intestate share within the six months
allowed by statute.3 Notice of election, bearing only the typewritten signature
of her attorney and not filed in the surrogate's court as required, had allegedly
been served upon one of the executors. In the widow's application for leave to
file proper notice of election, it was held that the fact that the will made no
provision for her did not dispense with the requirement of election, and that
neither her participation in a will contest, subsequently withdrawn, nor the
paper alleged to have been served by the attorney, was proper notice of an
intention to take her intestate share.
4
From the practical standpoint of certainty and effective administration there
is much to be said for the court's insistence upon a narrow construction of
the statute. In return for benefits decidedly more liberal than dower, compliance
with its terms would seem a small procedural price to pay. Had the court on
the other hand been at all solicitous of the welfare of the widow, it might well
have presumed that she would elect to take against a will which gave her nothing.
The equities in a case, however, have seldom moved courts to depart froni the
strict enforcement of estate laws. Thus where a period has been fixed for
the filing of claims against a decedent's estate, an infant's claim arising out
of the misappropriation of trust funds by a deceased guardian has been
1. N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 4, amending N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW
(1909) § 18.
2. DECEDENT ESTATE LAw, supra note 1, at §§ 82, 83; N. Y. REAL PROPERTY
LAW (1909), amended by N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 201. Common law rights
of dower and curtesy were abolished: id. § 189, 190.
3. As to the necessity of such personal election see In re Mihlman's Will,
140 Misc. 535, 251 N. Y. Supp. 147 (Sur. Ct. 1931). The same situation
previously prevailed in the case of election against a testamentary provision
in lieu of dower. Youngs v. Goodman, 240 N. Y. 470, 148 N. E. 639 (1925);
Flynn v. McDermott, 183 N. Y. 62, 75 N. E. 931 (1905); Carmardella v.
Schwartz, 126 App. Div. 334 (2d Dep't 1908); Report of N. Y. Decedent Estate
Commission, 117 (1930). The court may elect for an incompetent devisee,
however. Matter of Brown, 240 N. Y. 646, 148 N. E. 742 (1925).
4. In re Lottman's Estate, 145 Misc. 839, 261 N. Y. Supp. 400 (Sur. Ct.
1932). Accord: In re Zweig's Will, decided with the Lootrnan case, wherein
all but a minor portion of the testator's estate was left to his widow for life.
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disallowed when filed after the expiration of the statutory period.5 Likewise,
the non-claim statute has prevented recovery by a tardy creditor, although his
delay was occasioned by the administrator's fraudulent misreprezentations.
Consistent with this indifference to individual hardship, other courts which
have been confronted with a problem similar to that of the instant case, have
reached the same conclusion,7 reasoning that the election offered was an actual
one between the benefit given under the will, which in fact was nothing, and
the benefit to be secured by compliance with the estate law.8 This somewhat
paradoxical explanation of election has elsewhere been stated more plausibly
as a choice, not between alternative benefits, but between the right of over-
riding or abiding by the testator's disposition of his property.0
Recent decisions under the New York Law have adopted interpretations
more favorable to the widow, in striking contrast with the attitude of the
present court. Thus, while the widow may in certain cases be barred from
election if granted a life estate in an amount equal to her intestate share, the
right has been held to exist vhere the life estate was conditioned on her
remaining unmarried.' 0 Although an estate until remarriage is technically
a life estate, to effectuate the legislative intent to provide for the widow, the
court construed the statute as embracing only an indefeasible life estate
Similarly, the execution of a codicil subsequent to the statute has been given
the effect of sufficient republication of a will executed before its enactment, to
extend to the surviving spouse the alleged advantages of § 18.u
Since the purpose of the statute is to enhance the protection of the surviving
spouse by providing a more substantial substitute for the tenuous benefits of
dower, an election might well be considered unnecessary where the will itself
offers nothing to elect. Prior to the statute the widow was at least assured
that she could not be deprived of her dower interest by a will which gave
her nothing.12 Though purporting to increase her protection, the law as here
5. Davis v. Shepard, 135 Wash. 124, 237 Pac. 21 (1925); noted in (1925)
35 YALE L. J. 504; cf. Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U. S. 449 (1885).
6. Scherber v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 344, 177 N. W. 354 (1920); noted
in (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 97.
7. Shelton v. Sears, 187 Mass. 455, 73 N. E. 666 (1905); Shannon v. White,
109 Mass. 146 (1872); Minnich's Estate, 288 Pa. 355, 136 AtI. 236 (1927);
Cunningham's Estate, 137 Pa. 621, 20 AUl. 714 (1890); Flower's Estate, 30
Pa. D. & C. 967 (1921); but of. In re Dalsen's Estate, 165 AUt. 6 (Pa. 1933).
See also 1 Po=sRoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, (4th ed. 1918) § 515 ct seq.
8. Flower's Estate, spra note 7.
9. Kittel v. Smith, 136 Kans. 522, 16 P. (2d) 538 (1932); Cunningham's
Estate, supra note 7, at 628, 20 Atl., at 715.
10. In re Byrne's Estate, 141 Misc. 346, 252 N. Y. Supp. 587 (Sur. Ct.
1931), ajf'd, 235 App. Div. 782, 257 N. Y. Supp. 884 (1st Dep't 1932) ; noted in
(1931) 31 COL. L. Rzv. 1202.
11. In re Greenberg's Will, 141 Misc. 874, 253 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Sur. Ct.
1931), affd, 236 App. Div. 733, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1078 (2d Dep't 1932); noted
in (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1122; Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 128, 135; In r
Simeone, 141 Misc. 737, 253 N. Y. Supp. 683 (Sur. Ct. 1931). But of. In 70
Bertuch's Will, 225 App. Div. 773, 232 N. Y. Supp. 36 (2d Dep't 1928).
12. McGhee v. Stephens, 83 Ala. 466, 3 So. 808 (1888); Laurence v. Balch,
195 Ill. 626, 63 N. E. 506 (1902); Carper v. Crowl, 149 IlM. 465, 36 N. E. 1040
(1894); In re Zakroczymski, 222 Ill. App. 299 (1921); see Aldn v. Kellogg,
119 N. Y. 441, 450, 23 N. E. 1046, 1048 (1890); Jenkins v. Mollenhauer, 105
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construed actually removes all safeguard of a statutory return. Certainly in
this case the alleged serving of notice, admittedly defective, and the widow's
contest of the will, combined with the fact that the will itself left her nothing,
would seem sufficiently to indicate her dissatisfaction with its terms.
EFFECT OF NATIONAL BANKcRuPTcy ACT UPON ASSIGNMENTS
FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
IN the decisions of state courts determining the effect of national bankruptcy
legislation upon local statutes regulating general assignments for the benefit
of creditors, are to be found two conflicting views. Some courts have taken
the position that the state assignment statute is unaffected by the Bankruptcy
Act, except insofar as it provides for the discharge of the debtor.1 Others,
reasoning that the Bankruptcy Act and the assignment statutes have the
identical purpose of securing an equal distribution of the insolvent estate
among creditors, and that the two could not exist together, have reached the
conclusion that the state regulation was entirely superseded by the federal
law.2 In such cases, however, the common law assignment has been regarded
as still available to a debtor anxious to place his assets at the disposal of
creditors,3 though judicial supervision of the administration of the estate was
lost.4
Although essentially a federal problem, it was not until recently that the
United States Supreme Court had taken a definite stand on the question of
the extent to which the state assignment statutes and national insolvency laws
conflicted. The problem had been considered in the leading case of Boeso V.
King 5 where the Supreme Court sustained a statutory assignment against
an attack by two dissenting creditors. The Court, while conceding the sus-
pension of the discharge clause of the state statute, denied relief on the ground
that since the assignment constituted an act of bankruptcy, the attacking
creditor could have secured an administration of the debtor's assets for the
equal benefit of all creditors by a timely filing of an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy.7
Misc. 15, 17, 173 N. Y. Supp. 870, 872 (Sup. Ct. 1918). Where an actual
devise was made in lieu of dower, failure to elect dower constituted an election
to take under the will. Schaffenacker v. Beil, 320 Ill. 31, 150 N. E. 333 (1926) ;
Davis v. Mather, 309 Ill. 284, 141 N. E. 209 (1923); Akin v. Kellogg supra.
1. Patty-Joiner & Eubank Co. v. Cummins, 93 Tex. 598, 57 S. W. 566 (1900);
In re Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 210 N. W. 836 (1926).
2. Harbaugh v. Costello, 184 Ill. 110, 56 N. E. 363 (1900); Rowe v. Page,
54 N. H. 190 (1870), under the National Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 STAT.
536 (1867). See Ketcham v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709 (1900).
3. Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496 (1875); Pogue v. Rowe, 236 Ill. 157,
86 N. E. 207 (1908).
4. Harbaugh v. Costello, supra note 2.
5. 108 U. S. 379 (1883).
6. While there does not appear to have been any specific provision in the
Act of 1867 making a general assignment an act of bankruptcy, it was so held.
In re Burt, 4 Fed. Cas. 855 (C. C. Minn. 1870). There is no longer any doubt
under the Act of 1898 as first written, 30 STAT. 546 (1898), or as the Act now
reads as amended in 1926, 44 STAT. 662 (1926), 11 U. S. C. § 21(4) (1926).
7. Act of 1867, 14 STAT. 536 (1867).
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The Boese case was generally regarded as holding that the assignment
statute was not suspended, except as to its provision for the discharge of
the debtors and for a time it seemed as though the confusion among the state
-courts had been settled. But that the motivating cause for the decision in the
Boese case may simply have been a reluctance to grant the attacking creditors
a preference at the expense of consenting creditorsp was brought out in the
later Supreme Court decision of Intcrnational Shoo Co. v. Pinhus.lo Pursuant
to a state insolvency law containing a discharge clause,1' a debtor had trans-
ferred his assets to a receiver to be held for the benefit of creditors. A dis-
senting creditor, attacking the validity of the state law under which the
transfer had been made, sought to satisfy a judgment out of the funds in the
hands of the receiver. Mr. Justice Butler, who spoke for the Court, sustained
the attack, distinguishing the Boese case principally on the ground that here
the dissenting creditor could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court, since his claim was less than $500.12 The result of the Pinw,3
case was to revive the confusion surrounding the problem of the degree to
which the state and national insolvency laws conflicted. For it seemed as
though the Court had taken the anomolous position that the validity of the
state insolvency laws depended upon the amount of the attacking creditor's
clainL 3
In two recent cases,1 4 Mr. Justice Butler has done much to clear up this
confusion. In both actions assignments were sustained against attacking credi-
tors who had attempted to garnish the property of the debtors in the hands
of their assignees. The respective state courts had held that except for the
suspension of the discharge clauses, the assignment statutes were unaffected
by the Bankruptcy Act.15 In affirming this conclusion, the Supreme Court
declared in unmistakable language that its future policy would be to follow
the construction which the state courts place upon their local statutes. The
8. See Patty-Joiner & Eubank Co. v. Cummins, supra note 1, at 604, 57 S. W.
at 568; Williston, The Effect of a National Bankruptcy Lazo on Stale
Laws (1909) 22 HARv. L. REv. 547, 560; Note (1918) 16 MIcE. L. Rsv. 540,
543.
9. "It can hardly be that a court is obliged in vindication of an act of
Congress [the Bankruptcy Act] to lend its aid to those who, neglecting or
refusing to avail themselves of its provisions, seek to accomplish ends incon-
sistent with that equality among creditors which those provisions were designed
to secure." Supra note 5, at 386.
10. 278 U. S. 261 (1929), noted in (1929) 29 COL. L. REY. 519; (1929)
42 HARv. L. Ruv. 823; (1929) 27 MIcH. L. Rnv. 696.
11. ARx. Di. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1919) c. 93, §§ 5885-5893. Note
that this statute was not the Arkansas law regulating general assignments
for the benefit of creditors. The latter is found in id. c. 9, §§ 486-493.
12. "Three or more creditors who have provable claims against any person
which amount in the aggregate . . . to five hundred dollars or over; or if all
the creditors . . . are less than twelve in number, then one of such creditors
whose claim equals such amount may file a petition... " 30 STAT. 561
(1898), 11 U. S. C. § 95 (b) (1926).
13. See Note (1932) 10 TEx. L. REv. 197.
14. Pobreslo v. Joseph Boyd Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 262 (U. S. 1933); Johnson
v. Star, 53 Sup. Ct. 265 (U. S. 1933).
15. Pobreslo v. Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 242 N. W. 725 (Wis. 1932);
Johnson v. Star, 47 S. W. (2d) 608 (Tex. 1932); see note 1, supra.
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court gave no consideration to the fact that in one of the cases bankruptcy
proceedings were not available to the plaintiff, whose claim was well under
$500.16 That factor, so influential in the Pinkus case, appears to be no longer
of significance. An attempt was mad6 to distinguish the Pinkus case on the
ground that the statute there involved was an insolvency law distinct from
the state's general iassignment statute.17 The weakness in this distinction,
however, becomes apparent when it is noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court
had construed the insolvency law in the Pinkus case as having the same effect
as a general assignment.' 8
The policy adopted in the instant cases obviously does not create uniformity
among the states, but rather permits them to determine for themselves their
jurisdiction over general assignments. In one of the instant cases, the Supreme
Court expressly sanctioned the Texas policy of permitting a debtor to make
a statutory assignment for the sole benefit of those creditors who would re-
lease him from further liability.' 9 Under such an assignment the debtor'a
property is immunized from garnishment or levy of execution by non-assenting
creditors.29 Nor can a consenting creditor later repudiate his agreement and
sue for the balance of his claim, on the ground that the release is equivalent
to a discharge and is therefore invalidated by the Bankruptcy Act 21 Although
the assignment could be set aside by bankruptcy proceedings, an attacking
creditor would have nothing to gain, for in either case the property would be
ratably distributed among creditors, and the debtor would receive an effective
discharge. And since there would be no other property of the debtor from
which creditors could satisfy their claims, there is a strong inducement for
them to come in under the assignment. Thus with an adoption of the Texas
rule, the general assignment with a discharge can be made available to the
individual debtor as an effective and convenient method of settling with his
creditors.
16. Johnson v. Star, supra note 14.
17. See note 11, supra.
18. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 173 Ark. 316, 292 S. W. 996 (1927).
19. Johnson v. Star, supra note 14.
20. Patty-Joiner & Eubank Co. v. Cummins, supra note 1.
21. Hajek & Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S. W. 305 (1903). The
release provision under the Texas Statute is restricted to the case where the
creditor receives at least one-third of his claim.
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